Among the many international issues confronting the candidates for U.S. president and the American electorate in this fall’s election is the U.S. strategic posture with regard to Russia, its aggression against Ukraine, and the policies of its leader, Vladimir Putin.
We asked RAND experts John F. Tefft and William Courtney to answer a series of questions to frame the issues that will confront the next president regarding Russia. Together, they explore a range of critical issues, including the ongoing war in Ukraine, cybersecurity threats, economic sanctions, and the future of arms control agreements. They provide nuanced perspectives on how the United States can navigate these complex challenges while maintaining strong alliances and promoting global stability.
Tefft holds the Distinguished Chair in Diplomacy and Security at RAND. A career Foreign Service officer, he served as the U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation, Lithuania, Georgia, and Ukraine. Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at RAND. He was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the U.S.–Soviet Commission which implemented the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. He was special assistant to the president for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia.
What are the most important foreign policy challenges facing the United States regarding Russia?
John Tefft I think there are three main challenges. First, we must continue to resist Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and help Ukraine restore its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes continued military and economic assistance, and political support in any negotiations. European security depends on it. Second, we must maintain the unity of the NATO alliance both in helping Ukraine resist Russia, but more broadly in dealing with aggressive Russian policies in other areas. Third, we must not lose sight of other long-term challenges: maintaining the nuclear balance beyond the expiration of New START in 2026; dealing with national security implications of new technological advances in space, the cybersphere, and elsewhere; and staying focused on Russian potential domestic political and economic changes, including the succession to Putin.
William Courtney The main U.S. challenge is to confront Russia over its aggressive behavior while retaining the ability to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. Specific challenges include: supporting Ukraine’s defense against Russian military aggression and aiding Ukraine’s economy, enforcing sanctions and other measures to constrain Russia’s war-fighting potential, bolstering NATO forces in the alliance’s eastern flank, maintaining a stable nuclear arms balance beyond the expiration of the New START Treaty in 2026, protecting U.S. security and other interests in the Arctic, providing consular assistance to Americans in Russia, seeking Russian cooperation on climate-related issues, maintaining a viable U.S. Embassy in Moscow while imposing reciprocal treatment on the Russian Embassy in Washington, and supporting the International Space Station until it is deorbited after 2030.
What’s the best path forward for the United States in promoting an end to the war in Ukraine?
Tefft We need to continue to support Ukraine with military, economic and political assistance. Putin is counting on the West to buckle in a long war of attrition. We cannot give in. We need to maintain the strategic patience we exhibited during the Cold War. As Ukraine moots ideas for a possible negotiated solution to the war in the wake of its incursion into Kursk, we need to work closely with the Zelenskyy government and our NATO allies in presenting a common front to Russia.
Courtney The United States can best promote an end to the war by working with Ukraine and U.S. allies to raise the cost to Moscow of aggression until it withdraws its forces. This was the successful U.S. strategy in the 1980s to counter Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, which ended in 1989 with a pull-out of all forces. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the West has provided Ukraine with substantial military support, including increasingly sophisticated weaponry. The West has been too cautious, however, in allowing arms it supplies to be used on Russian territory.
The United States can best promote an end to the war by working with Ukraine and U.S. allies to raise the cost to Moscow of aggression until it withdraws its forces.
What could the United States government do to address the threat of cyberattacks and cyber espionage originating from Russia?
Tefft Identifying and resisting Russian cyberattacks has become a principal focus of the United States and our allies for many years. We need to reiterate our messages to the Russian government that we will not tolerate cyberattacks on our government, political parties, and business. We must continue to mount and fund an aggressive overt and covert campaign against Russian cyberattacks. This includes continued close government and business efforts to build defenses against cyberattacks.
Courtney Russia’s cyber campaigns give priority to attacking U.S. government and military infrastructure and information, and to spreading disinformation to influence public opinion and undermine democratic processes. The United States should continue working with allies and partners to improve defense against and respond to cyber threats from Russia and other authoritarian states and to hold bad actors accountable, such as through sanctions and prosecutions. Robust collaboration, particularly between the public and private sectors, is essential to securing cyberspace.
How should the United States respond if new evidence surfaces that confirms further Russian interference in U.S. elections?
Tefft The United States needs to employ new sanctions against Russia in the event of further Russian interference in U.S. elections. The new steps should hit Russia in areas where the cost of their actions will be clear to the Russian leadership. Russia cannot be allowed to undermine U.S. democracy and escape scot-free.
Courtney In July, American intelligence officials said Russia had begun efforts to influence U.S. elections this year. In response to interference in 2016, the United States announced that it would pursue overt and covert responses. Overt measures included sanctions, expulsion of Russian diplomats, and closure of two Russian diplomatic compounds. Some of these actions, or potentially other steps, could be employed in response to interference this year. To deter future interference, the United States might impose higher costs in 2024 than it did in 2016.
Are the economic sanctions working, should they be expanded or otherwise modified?
Tefft The Russian economy is growing because of massive government investments in the defense sector, but there are increasing signs of long term deterioration. Economic sanctions have had a substantial impact on the Russian economy and finances, but the Russian government has been able to evade some of them. Economic sanctions are a long-term policy tool. They most often do not bring quick results. They can also be a double-edged sword as sanctions can harm those imposing the sanctions. We and our allies have continued to refine our sanctions regime, balancing the need to tighten the screws while mitigating the harm done to our own economies. We need to continue to sanction third parties providing technology essential for Russia’s weapons production and its economic development.
Courtney In July, eight European finance ministers cited “many signs that the Russian war economy is deteriorating.” Russia continues to suffer from substantial capital flight, tens of billions of dollars per year. This reduces sources of funding for investment in economic capacity and technology. The war economy is producing high inflation and interest rates, which will harm Russia’s growth and reduce productivity. Although Russia’s economy this year is expected to grow by 3.2 percent, according to the IMF, the level of GDP may have been 5 percent higher absent Western sanctions. Going forward, many Russians will pay in lower living standards for the costly war economy.
What steps could be taken to reassure NATO allies in Eastern Europe and strengthen the alliance in the face of Russian aggression?
Tefft The United States must continue to support robustly NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” on its eastern flank with rotational multinational battle groups. U.S. troops should continue a strong exercise schedule both to maintain readiness and to deter Russia from thinking that they can spread their current Ukrainian military campaign into Poland or the Baltic countries.
Courtney NATO has an “enhanced forward presence” in its eastern flank, with rotational multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia. In the event of Russian aggression against an ally, NATO will need to surge forces. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, allies activated defense plans and deployed thousands of extra troops. NATO has over 500,000 high-readiness forces which can be rapidly deployed. In 2024, 23 allies are expected to meet or exceed the alliance’s target of investing at least 2 percent of GDP in defense, compared to only three allies in 2014.
Is there any hope for renewing or renegotiating arms control agreements with Russia, such as the New START Treaty?
Tefft Putin has suspended Russia’s participation in the implementation of the New Start agreement. At this point it seems likely that the New Start Treaty will lapse next year, as there is no provision for a second extension. It seems unlikely that any serious negotiation of new arms control agreements with Russia will occur while Russia wages war in Ukraine. Moreover, China is rapidly increasing its nuclear arms. Any new administration will undoubtedly also have to address the growing Chinese threat if a new arms control agreement is going to have any chance of ratification in the Senate.
Courtney The New START has been extended once, to 2026. It has no provision for another extension. After the Treaty expires, the two sides could pledge on their own to abide by some or all of its limitations. Moscow and Washington took similar action in 1977 when the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement expired. Last year, Putin suspended Russian participation in the New START. This ended mutual onsite inspections, which are vital for verifying Russian compliance with the treaty. Putin said Russia would not resume participation until the United States cuts off support to Ukraine. Under the Putin regime, prospects for a new treaty are poor. Moreover, the United States would likely be unwilling to conclude a new treaty without China, which seems to be reaching for strategic nuclear parity with Russia and the United States.
Are there any novel solutions out there that could make a difference for U.S. interests in the region?
Tefft Change will eventually come to Russia, even if it seems unlikely today. Putin will eventually be replaced. A new generation of politicians will come to the fore. Some will likely try to maintain the essence of Putin’s policies. Others could push for change. The failed mutiny of mercenary leader Yevgeny V. Prigozhin is evidence of the length to which some might go to effect change. Economic, demographic, and social pressures—some generated or exacerbated by the war—could stimulate a strong desire for change from the Russian elites and the population. Mikhail Gorbachev’s succession is one historical example, although there are many variants possible. This is why we must closely follow internal developments. We must continue to be ready for such change, and think through the implications for our own policy choices.
Change will eventually come to Russia, even if it seems unlikely today. Putin will eventually be replaced.
Courtney Liberalizing regime change in Moscow could make an important difference. This happened in 1985, with the ascension of Gorbachev to the top position in the Soviet leadership. He reversed many Brezhnev-era confrontational policies. Gorbachev sought to ease repression at home and tensions with the West. Under his leadership, nuclear arms accords with essential onsite inspection became possible, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and START Treaties. Gorbachev also oversaw the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Looking ahead, a Russian pull-out from Ukraine and conclusion of new nuclear arms treaties might depend on the ascension of new, more liberal leadership in Russia.
Courtney Yes. Europe and the United States cooperate closely, with each contributing substantially to Ukraine’s defense and economy. Europe has provided more total aid to Ukraine than the United States, but the United States provides slightly more military assistance. According to the Kiel Institute, as of April 30, 2024, Europe has allocated EUR 102 billion in total aid, versus the United States, EUR 74 billion. In military aid, the United States has allocated EUR 50 billion, or EUR 2.5 billion more than Europe.
