The world banned biological weapons 50 years ago, but the threat is still growing.
This March marked the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which banned the development, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons. The BWC has been adopted by 188 nations to date, including a noncompliant Russia. But despite that noncompliance, there has not yet been widespread Russian use of biological attacks. Why? There are three key reasons: the global norm against their use codified in the BWC, strong deterrence by the United States in support of its NATO allies and partners (such as Ukraine), and a firm commitment to biosecurity within the U.S. federal government.
Today, these three pillars are each under threat.
The first is due to the simple fact that Russia—despite the BWC—has continued its biological weapons program, which ultimately hurts the efficacy of the convention. Russia’s ongoing biological weapons program violates the first article of the BWC, which erodes the trust of the 188 states parties that ratified the treaty to ban the pursuit and use of biological weapons.
The second revolves around the Trump administration’s wavering support for its NATO allies and partners, including Ukraine, which may embolden Russia to use these weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine and beyond.
The third is due to recent unilateral actions by the Trump administration, such as firing personnel and terminating congressionally funded programs that are central to biosecurity and preventing the development and use of biological weapons.
In March, the Department of Defense directed agencies responsible for deterring biological and chemical threats to provide assessments for a reduction in staff and funding of programs from intervals ranging from 25 percent to a complete dismantling. These are clearly different from typical budget drills and potentially set the stage for Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to eliminate the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The CTR program bolsters the biodefense capabilities of partner nations to safely handle, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks and biological threats—and other vital overseas Defense Department efforts that serve as the United States’s best first line of defense against biological weapons. This includes, specifically, the ability to detect biological and chemical threats, as well as the ability to operate effectively in biologically and chemically contaminated environments.
Other policy-breaking cuts to federal programs related to biosecurity are already emboldening Russia and others. For example, following the elimination of U.S. Agency for International Development partnerships across Africa during an ongoing Ebola outbreak, the Russian Federation sent government officials to Uganda to “assist … in the fight against Ebola.” Aside from the irony of Moscow’s history of weaponizing Ebola as part of its biological weapons program, this move speaks to the immediate erosion of U.S. power across the globe as China and Russia exploit the aftermath of unprecedented and inconsistent changes by the so-called Department of Government Efficiency’s Elon Musk and other individuals embedded within the executive branch.
Dismantling biodefense and international health programs not only signals that the United States doesn’t value critical and proactive biosecurity measures but also renders the U.S. government less able to monitor and respond to the development of bioweapons and their potential use, along with all other biological threats, both naturally occurring and accidental disease outbreaks.
While it is yet to be seen how the Trump administration formally introduces its biodefense policies and incorporates them into the National Security Strategy, these early actions are likely already being exploited by Putin’s Russia—including Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaign focused on eroding trust in the United States’s rightful biodefense activities and setting the stage for potential offensive action by Putin. Moscow’s recent disinformation campaign is centered on spreading a lie that the laboratories in former Soviet bloc countries with U.S. support via the CTR program—such as Ukraine and Georgia—are creating biological weapons. In reality, the CTR partnership provides vital resources to track infectious disease outbreaks and bolster the biosecurity around the facilities.
The risk of Russia using biological weapons is not just an academic thought experiment. Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine is entering its fourth year. In those four years, multiple experts have raised concerns about Moscow considering the use of chemical or biological weapons. Such alarms have been based on credible intelligence, and Russia’s historic willingness to use asymmetric warfare to gain leverage, particularly when it finds itself at an impasse, or when it sees an opportunity. The possibility of Russia using these weapons as a means of unlocking the current stalemate is, therefore, still very real, particularly given the growing perception of a weakened U.S.-NATO deterrent.
This is consistent with Russia’s long-standing approach to chemical weapons, which are also banned under the Chemical Weapons Convention. And in this case, Russia has gone further: It has used them. Recent examples include targeted assassination attempts against perceived threats to Putin’s power, including Alexei Navalny and the Skripals, along with hundreds of chemical weapons attacks in Ukraine since 2022, verified by the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Russia also obstructed the joint investigation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations into the Assad regime for multiple instances of chemical weapons use in Syria.
Reporting in October 2024 detailed Russia’s expansion of ex-Soviet military laboratories where pathogens, including those responsible for viral hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola, were researched for its biological weapon program.
The Trump administration’s continuous weakening of biodefense efforts could encourage more of this behavior, essentially telling Russia that it can violate biological weapons norms without fearing any meaningful consequences. This is a reversal of traditional U.S. asymmetrical strength—working by, with, and through allies and partners to address issues—and must be changed now.
Washington should start by sending a strong and clear message to Russia that the United States is firmly committed to deterring biological weapons. This involves both rhetoric and concrete action to unequivocally condemn any acts pursuing the development, production, use, and threat of use of biological weapons. The administration must also reverse course on any words and actions that diminish the deterrent effects of NATO countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, as well as planned cuts to biodefense and related health security programs across the federal government.
More specifically, the Department of Defense must commit to deterring biological threats through supporting and resourcing pathogen early warning systems; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard protections; international training exercises; biological threat attribution programs; and world-class research and innovation in biotechnology. These expenditures have made up less than half of one percent of the department’s total budget, constituting one of the highest rates of return on investment for the United States in risk reduction. On the health security side, the administration should restore support and funding for cross-governmental programs that bolster deterrence against biothreats, both deliberate and otherwise. While the national security rationale is urgent, these actions are vital to Americans’ health and economic interests.
The good news is that the administration need not start from scratch. In his first term, President Trump identified deliberate biological threats as priority concerns in both the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. Further, the 2018 National Biodefense Strategy detailed a whole-of-government strategy to deter, prepare for, respond to, and mitigate biological threats. So, in order to reverse course from the current dangerous path, the president needs only take cues from the positive progress that he ordered himself in his first term.
If left unchecked, Russia and potentially other adversaries will continue to exploit these lapses in U.S. deterrence against the development and use of biological threats. To put it bluntly, it is now a risk that Putin and his regime will use biological weapons with impunity, all while the United States loses its influence and ability to detect biothreats of all types. There is no good reason to walk that path. Both American and global security will be much better served if the Trump administration reverts to its previous strengths and restores the processes and investments needed to make sure such terrible weapons are never used.
– Daniel P. Regan is a senior fellow at the Janne E. Nolan Center on Strategic Weapons, an institute of the Council on Strategic Risks. A biomedical engineer specializing in pathogen collection, detection, and mitigation, Regan is recognized as an expert contributing to international efforts addressing the intersection of advancements in science and the evolving biodefense landscape. Published courtesy of Lawfare.
